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NOTES AND COMMENTS
In North Carolina, while previously no situation has arisen com-
parable to the principal case, the court has strongly inclined towards
upholding and enforcing the public duty of the utility to serve all
similarly situated on equal terms 24  Was the plaintiff in the prin-
cipal case "similarly situated ?" It has further been held that the com-
pany may refuse to serve those who will not comply with its reason-
able rules and regulations. 25  Was not the requirement for an addi-
tional deposit "reasonable" under the circumstances?
It would seem that the court has displayed extraordinary solic-
itude for the subscriber. The decision is partly justified by the re-
quirement of payment in advance, but how is the company to protect
itself against nonpayment of additional charges, such as long dis-
tance calls?
CECILE L. PIrTZ.
Real Property-Adverse Possession of Separate
Interests in Land.
The plaintiff occupied land by adverse possession under color of
title for the statutory period. The defendant claimed the timber
growing on the land, basing his claim on a recorded timber deed
givdn prior to the time the plaintiff took possession of the land.
Held: The adverse possession of the land did not conclude the prior
lessee of the timber upon the land.'
Under both the common law and the Georgia Code "the right of
the owner of lands extends downward and upward indefinitely."2
Yet, there may be ownership in fee of several distinct interests in
connection with a single tract of land. One person may own the
surface of the land, another the buildings, another the timber grow-
ing on the land, and still another the minerals beneath the surface.8
Therefore, one having title to the surface may have valid claims as-
"Griffin v. Goldsboro Water Co., 122 N. C. 206, 30 S. E. 319 (1898);
Clinton-Dunn Telephone Co. v. Carolina Tel. & Tel. Co., 159 N. C. 8, 74
S. E. 636 (1912); S. & S. Ry. Co. & N. C. Pub. Service Co. v. So. Pr. Co.,
180 N. C. 422, 105 S. E. 28 (1920).
' Woodley v. Carolina Tel. & Tel. Co., 163 N. C. 284, 79 S. E. 598
(1913).
McNeill v. Daniel, 164 S. E. 187 (Ga. 1932).
12 BL. CoMM. 18; GA. CoDE ANN. (Michie, 1926) §3617.
'Fox v. Pearl River Lumber Co., 80 Miss. 1, 31 So. 583 (1902); Walters
v. Sheffield, 78 Fla. 505, 78 So. 539 (1918).
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serted against him for the timber growing on the surface,4 and for
minerals beneath the surface.5
Timber may be severed from the surface by deed, and an estate
in fee, a corporeal hereditament, created therein. 0 In that event,
possession of the surface by an adverse claimant is not necessarily
adverse to the owner of the timber.7 For the limitation to run
against the timber owner, there, must be such possession of the tim-
ber evidenced by acts of ownership and control as would amount to a
separate adversd claim to the timber. s
Analogous cases are* found where the title to mineral rights has
been severed from the title to the surface, and the adverse possessor
of the surface claims title to the minerals. In such cases the courts
hold that the adverse possessor must take actual possession of the
minerals by operating mines, before the limitation will run against
the mineral owner.9 A recent case in Kentucky holds that where
minerals are severed from the surface by conveyance, the surface
owner holds possession of the minerals in trust for the mineral
owner, and no limitation can run against the latter.10 But Louisiana
takes the view that deeds conveying mineral rights convey only "real
rights" in the nature of servitude, which may be lost by non-use for
ten years to the possessor of the surface who gets title to the minerals
by prescription."
'Southwestern Lumber Co. of N. J. v. Evans, 275 S. W. 1078 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1925); Prince v. Frost-Johnson Lumber Co., 250 S. W. 785 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1923).
' Claybrooke v. Barns, 180 Ark. 678, 22 S. W. (2d) 390, 67 A. L. R. 1436
(1929); Kentucky Block Cannel Coal Co. v. Seawell, 249 F. 840, 1 A. L. R.
556 (C. C. A. 6th, 1918); Green v. West Texas Coal Mining and Developing
Co., 225 S. W. 548 (Tex. Civ. App. 1920).
'Florence, Phillips and Co. v. Newsome, 26 Ga. App. 501, 106 S. E. 619
(1921); Lodwick Lumber Co. v. Taylor, 100 Tex. 270, 98 S. W. 238 (1906);
Magnetic Ore Co, v. Marbury Lumber Co., 104 Ala. 465, 16 So. 632, 27
L. R. A. 434 (1894) ; Walters v. Sheffield, supra note 3.
' Southwestern Lumber Co. of N. J. v. Evans, supra note 4. Cf. Prewitt
v. Bull, 234 Ky. 18, 27 S. W. (2d) 399 (1930); and Prince v. Frost-Johnson
Lumber Co., supra note 4, where possession of land by owmers thereof was
held not adverse possession of timber belonging to others.
$ Southwestern Lumber Co. of N. J. v. Evans, supra note 4. The dissenting
judge in the principal case, while not raising the question of the severability
of the land and timber interests, felt that there had been sufficient adverse
possession both of the land and the timber to warrant a different result.
IClaybrooke v. Barns; Kentucky Block Cannel Coal Co. v. Seawell, both
supra note 5.'" Franklin Fluorspar Co. v. Hosick, 239 Ky. 453, 39 S. W. (2d) 665 (1931).
"Louisiana Petroleum Co. v. Broussard, 172 La. 613, 135 So. 1 (1931);
La Del Oil Properties Inc. v. Magnolia Petroleum Co,, 169 La. 1137, 126 So.
684 (1930). See EA. Rv. Civ. CoDE (Merrick, 1925) arts. 3529, 3546.
NOTE'S AND COMMENTS
The result in the instant case is apparently correct, but the ration-
ale of the decision is not clear. The court gives no reason for its
decision other than to say dogmatically that "such occupancy (by the
possessor of the land) is consistent with, and not as a matter of law
adverse to, the possession of the prior lessee." It is believed that
the same result could have been reached on the basis of other deci-
sions: First, the timber case, mentioned above, 12 in which the lease
was held to create a separate interest in fee in the timber against
which adverse possession of the land alone would not be effective;
and, second, by reasoning from analogy to the mineral cases.13
W. E. ANGLIN.
Res Judicata-Judgment in Ejectment Suit as Res Judicata
Preventing Restitution of Land.
A judgment of interpleader, construing a will, gave B a right to
rents and profits accruing from a certain tract of land. While an
appeal was pending B brought an action in ejectment against A, who
was in possession of the tract, and recovered. A did not appeal.
The original judgment of interpleader was reversed on appeal, the
court construing the will in favor of A. A now brings an action in
ejectment to regain possession of the land. Held: The first judg-
ment in ejectment not having been appealed from is res judicata as
to the question of the title to the land (Cardozo, Brandeis, and Stone,
JJ., dissenting).'
The majority of the court explains its decision upon the ground
that the original suit in equity for rents and profits and the first suit
in ejectment were separate and unrelated suits. Therefore, the re-
versal of the original judgment did not give grounds for restitution
as to the lands in the ejectment suit. The minority contends that the
first action in ejectment was dependent upon the interpleader judg-
ment, and that this second suit in ejectment is in effect a suit for
restitution to which the plaintiff is entitled.
If the construction placed upon the will by the interpleader judg-
ment-that the title to the land in question was in B-is conclusive
until reversed, then the first ejectment judgment was dependent upon
the interpleader judgment. The general rule is that where a judg-
' Southwestern Lumber Co. of N. 1. v. Evans, supra note 4.
"' Claybrooke v. Barns; Kentucky Block Cannel Coal Co. v. Seawell, both
supra note 5.
SReed v. Allen, 286 U. S. 191, 52 Sup. Ct. 532, 76 L. ed. 749 (1932). This
case has been commented upon in (1932) 88 U. oF PA. L. REv. 77.
